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Most of us are familiar with the spectre of Pandora's Box,
the "present which seems valuable, but which in reality is a
curse."' Robert Graves described Pandora as "the most beautiful
[woman] ever created.",2 She was sent by Zeus as a gift to
Epimetheus, who initially "respectfully" declined to marry her.3
But chastened by the fate of his brother Prometheus, he changed
his mind and wed a women who was "as foolish, mischievous,
and idle as she was beautiful.",4 She opened a jar that she and
her husband had been "warned. .. to keep closed in which"5
Prometheus had "imprison[ed in it] all the Spites that might
plague mankind: such as Old Age, Labour, Sickness, Insanity,
Vice, and Passion. Out these flew in a cloud, stung Epimetheus
and Pandora in every part of their bodies, and then attacked the
race of mortals."
6
What is generally less well known is that the jar was a
wedding gift, which to my way of thinking makes Pandora's
Box an appropriate proxy for the goals being pursued by the
Colorado baker Jack Phillips.
Phillips describes himself as "a Christian who strives to
honor God in all aspects of his life, including how he treats
Wylie H. Davis Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. Special
thanks to Jessica Guarino, Class of 2019, and Shannon Stroud, Class of 2020, for their
extraordinary research contributions.
1. Pandora's Box, BREWER'S CONCISE PHRASE & FABLE (Betty Kirkpatrick ed.
2000).
2. ROBERT GRAVES, THE GREEK MYTHS: TffE COMPLETE AND DEFINITIVE
EDITION 39h (Penguin Books 2017) (1955). She is also described as "the All-gifted,"
given that "each of the gods gave her some power which was to bring about the ruin of
man." Pandora's Box, supra note 1.





people and runs his business." 7 He believes "[a]s core tenets of
his faith ... that marriage is a sacred union between one man
and one woman, and that it represents the relationship of Jesus
Christ and His Church." 8  He refuses, accordingly, to provide
wedding cakes for same sex marriages. So when Charlie Craig
and David Mullins visited his business as they planned their
wedding reception, he "politely explained that he does not
design wedding cakes for same-sex marriages, but
emphasized... he was happy to make other items for them."
9
Hesiod characterized the seeds of Pandora's Box as "the
countless troubles" that might "roam among men." 10  In this
instance, the foundations for countless troubles lie within two
key Supreme Court precedents, Frazee v. Illinois Department of
Employment Security," and United States v. Ballard.12 Neither
factored in Jack Phillips' first and perhaps not last appearance
before the Supreme Court, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission. 13 But both have substantial
implications for the ongoing debate about whether it is either
necessary or appropriate to grant religion-based exemptions to
public accommodations laws.
Frazee makes it clear that individuals claiming the
protection of the Free Exercise Clause need not be practicing
members of a recognized sect in order to receive the Clause's
protection.14  Rather, they need only profess a "sincere belief
7. Brief for Petitioners at 8, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights
Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief]. The
argument posed by Phillips' concession that he would provide other products and services
to Craig and Mullins was rejected in Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 62
(N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1046 (2014) ("Elane Photography's willingness to
offer some services to Willock does not cure its refusal to provide other services that it
offered to the general public").
8. Petitioners Brief, supra note 7, at 9.
9. Id. at 10. At the time of the request same-sex marriage was not available in
Colorado. Craig and Mullins were accordingly married in Massachusetts and were
planning for a post-nuptial reception in Colorado. See Brief for Respondents Charlie Craig
and David Mullins at 4, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Conm'n, 138 S.
Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111) [hereinafter Craig & Mullins Brief].
10. HESIOD, Works and Days, in THEOGONY AND WORKS AND DAYS 35, 40 (M.L.
West trans., Oxford World's Classics ed. reprt. 2008.
11. 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
12. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
13. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
14. Frazee, 489 U.S. at 829.
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that religion require[s them] to refrain from the [conduct] in
question., 15  Ballard, in turn, tells us that the "[f]reedom of
thought" protected by the First Amendment "embraces the right
to maintain theories of life and of death and the hereafter which
are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths."' 16  It is
accordingly not the province of the courts to judge "those
teachings false," no matter how "incredible, if not preposterous
[they might seem] to most people."' 7 For to do so would mean
that "little indeed would be left of religious freedom."' 8 Rather,
the sole question is whether the belief in question is sincerely
held. "Heresy trials," the Court tells us in no uncertain terms,"are foreign to our Constitution."' 19
Pandora's Cake, if you will, lies in wait. What are the
implications if, as was the case with Jack Phillips, the adherent
seeking Free Exercise protection need not ascribe to the tenets or
15. Id. at 833. The decision was not cited by the Court, any of the parties, or amici
in Masterpiece Cakeshop.
16. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86. This case was also not cited by the Court and was
discussed only in passing in the amicus briefs. See, e.g., Brief of Billy Graham
Evangelistic Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 26, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111)
(noting the Ballard holding that while "courts cannot inquire into [] an individual's
asserted religious beliefs [to determine veracity], they can inquire as to whether the
individual honestly and in good faith actually holds such beliefs"); Brief of the Foundation
for Moral Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 16-17, Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111) ("The Colorado
Civil Rights Commission and the CCA have neither the jurisdiction nor the competence to
tell Phillips what does or does not constitute a substantial burden upon his religious beliefs.
By so doing, they are acting in a manner that this Court prohibited in... Ballard.").
17. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87. As Professor Koppelman notes, the problem is not
simply whether one might be tempted to argue that a given religious belief is "obviously
wrong" or "false." Andrew F. Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and
the Purpose of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REv 619, 626 (2015). It is also the
extent to which such beliefs are "destructive" and "give transcendent sanction to
discrimination and inequality." Id. His answer, consistent with Ballard, is to "depriven
[them] of their cultural power." ld.
18. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87.
19. Id. In a similar vein, status as a "religion" is not confined to recognized sects or
creeds. Realizing that the Establishment Clause posed problems for a selective service
regime that granted conscientious objector status only to members of groups like the Amish
and Mennonites, the Court has fashioned an analogic definition of religion, characterizing
it as "[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its professor a place
parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption." United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
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be a practicing member of a recognized sect? 20 And what
follows from the realization that that individual's beliefs, when
sincerely held, are not subject to question? Do they deserve
protection, even in the face of what Justice Antonin Scalia has
characterized as a "valid and neutral law of general
applicability"? 21  In particular, do we heed civil rights statutes
protecting heretofore unfavored groups, 22 statutes that target
conduct society deems inappropriate, perhaps even abhorrent?
Or do we "forbid[] the government from coercing artistic
expression contrary to conscience," 23  no matter how
idiosyncratic or preposterous others might find the religious
beliefs in question? In short, should the individuals pursuing the
sorts of claims advanced by Jack Phillips and his many amici be
careful about what they wish for?
I. THE PROBLEM
As a threshold matter, it is important to recognize that
Masterpiece Cakeshop did not actually decide anything of
consequence. Yes, the Court issued an opinion. But no - as
most commentators have recognized,2 4 albeit not some members
20. Jack Phillips averred that his beliefs were "derive[d] ... from the first and
second chapters of Genesis in the Bible, as well as other passages from the Bible ... which
dcscribe[ marriage as a picture of Christ's relationship with the Church" and that "[t]he
Bible ... instructs me to 'flee' or run from sinful things, and in particular those relating to
sexual morality." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 274a-75a, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111) (Phillips Aff. 13, 16).
His attorney in turn has confirmed that "Jack is not a member of a particular
denomination." Email from Kristen Waggoner, Alliance Defending Freedom, to author
(Aug. 20, 2018) (on file with author).
21. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)
(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n. 3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(internal quotation mark omitted)).
22. The laws in question tend to be uniform in their articulation of the groups to be
protected. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2014) ("disability, race, creed,
color, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national origin, or ancestry"); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659A.403(l) (2015) ("race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin,
marital status[,] or age").
23. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 2, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil
Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111) [hereinafter Reply Brief].
24. See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, Comment, The Etiquette of
Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133, 133 (2018) ("The case presented a legal conflict between
LGBT rights and religious liberty. But the Court ducked the central questions raised by
that conflict.").
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of the Court25 - it did not actually resolve any of the real issues
presented in that case. Instead, it punted, holding only that
given what were described as flaws in the decision-making
process below, Jack Phillips was denied "neutral and respectful
consideration" of his claims in ways that exhibited "a clear and
impermissible hostility toward sincere religious beliefs., 26  So
the no-decision decision generated what was in effect a remand,
with "[t]he outcome ... await[ing] further elaboration[s], 27
giving all of the parties in this and similar cases additional bites
at the cake.28
Three of my favorite things in matters constitutional are a
book and a pair of cases. The book is Richard Kluger's
magisterial Simple Justice,29 the elegant and definitive study of
the litigation that became collectively known as Brown v. Board
of Education of Topeka, Kansas.30  As I recently observed,
Brown remains entitled to its place in the positive constitutional
canon, but not because of what it tells us about the law that now
applies to racial discrimination in the structure and delivery of
K-12 education. 31 Rather, it merits the respect it has earned as a
study about the nature and pursuit of justice, in particular, its
role in realizing the transcendent ideal "that animated the
American nation at its beginning.., radiant [and] honored...
the inherent equality of mankind.,
32
25. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1740 (2018) ("1 agree that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission ... violated Jack
Phillips' right to freely exercise his religion.") (Thomas, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 1729 (majority opinion).
27. Id. at 1732.
28. That was clearly the effect of the Kennedy opinion, albeit not one he articulated,
stating only that "[t]he judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals is reversed." Id. For
verification, see Arlene's Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671, 2671 (2018)
("remanded . for further consideration in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop"),aff'd, 441 P.3d
1203 (Wash. 2019), petition for cert. filed, 86 U.S.L.W. 3636 (U.S. Sept. 12, 2019) (No.
19-333); Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor and Indus., 139 S. Ct. 2713, 2713 (2019) (same). A
new and arguably "cleaner" case has in turn arrived at the Court's doorstep. See Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 139 S. Ct. 2713 (2019) (No.
18-547) [hereinafter Klein Petition].
29. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE THE HISTORY Of BROWN v. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976).
30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. Mark R. Killenbeck, Constitutional Heresy?, 62 ST. Louis U. L.J. 667 (2018).
32. KLUGER, supra note 30, at ix.
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The cases are Frazee and Ballard. In Frazee the Supreme
Court declared that William Frazee was entitled to claim an
exemption from the "suitable work" requirement in the Illinois
unemployment compensation statute when he refused to accept a
position that would require him to work on Sunday. That was
an issue, the state believed, because Frazee did "not claim that
his refusal to work on Sunday is based on any tenet of a church
or religious body.",33 He was simply "a Christian and as such he
feels it wrong to work on Sunday." 34  This was insufficient
because Illinois required that any "injunction against Sunday
labor must be found in a tenet or dogma of an established
religious sect.",35 The Supreme Court disagreed, unanimously
"reject[ing] the notion that to claim the protection of the Free
Exercise Clause, one must be responding to the commands of a
particular religious organization." 36 In effect, justice trumped a
state's narrow vision of the law.
Ballard in turn arose when charges were brought against
Edna and Donald Ballard for making "false and fraudulent
representations, pretenses and promises," in particular that they
had "the power to heal persons of ailments and diseases and to
make well persons afflicted with any diseases, injuries, or
ailments.' 37  In their defense, the Ballards averred that they
"'honestly and in good faith believe[d] those things."' 38 The
Court held that "the truth or verity of [their] religious doctrines
or beliefs should [not] have been submitted to the jury,"
39
declaring that "[t]he law knows no heresy, and is committed to
the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. ' 4°
Conceding that "[t]he religious views espoused... might seem
incredible, if not preposterous, to most people,' the Court
nevertheless emphasized that "if those doctrines are subject to
33. Frazee v. Dep't ofEmp't Sec., 512 N.E.2d 789, 791 (111. App. Ct. 1987).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 792.
36. Frazee, 489 U.S. at 834.
37. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 79-80 (1943) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
38. Seeid. at 81.
39. Id. at 86.
40. Id. (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
41. Id. at 87.
Vol. 72:4774
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trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then
the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect., 42
What I would like to suggest is that there is a looming
problem posed by the collision of notions of justice and
sincerely held religious beliefs in the pairing of Frazee and
Ballard with Masterpiece Cakeshop. Stripped to its essence,
Masterpiece Cakeshop was an appeal for the sort of "simple
justice" that Brown embodied. Could a state force a sincere
believer to compromise her or his beliefs in the face of a"governmental [desire] to protect the rights and dignity of gay
persons who are, or wish to be, married but face discrimination
when they seek goods or services? ' 43 Or should Jack Phillips-
and presumably all individuals like him, persons with "deep
religious faith whose beliefs guide [their] work"44-be entitled
to an exemption from what are undeniably neutral laws, laws
that apply to all citizens and forbid discrimination against
certain classes of individuals? 45
As indicated, the Masterpiece Cakeshop Court punted: it
did not reach the merits of the two constitutional issues posed,
free exercise and compelled speech. Rather, it held only that
certain procedural defects below denied Jack Phillips "the
neutral and respectful consideration of his claims in all the
circumstances of the case."46  In particular, it focused on
religion, declaring that "[t]he [Colorado] Civil Rights
Commission's treatment of [t]his case has some elements of a
42. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87. On remand, the Court of Appeals summarily affirmed
the convictions. Ballard v. United States, 152 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1945). The Supreme
Court reversed, Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946), holding that the systematic
exclusion of women from the jury "deprive[d] the jury system of the broad base it was
designed by Congress to have in our democratic society." ld. at 195. The indictment was
dismissed, id. at 196, and there is no record that the government refiled the charges.
43. Id. at 1723.
44. Petitioners Brief, supra note 7, at 1.
45. Counsel for Phillips argued that the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, CoLo.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601 (West 2014), was not in fact a neutral law, but was rather a
"content based" restriction on free speech, given its "'operation' and effect." Reply Brief,
supra note 24, at 20-21 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 647 (1994)).
I take no position on whether it is correct that the application of a statute that is facially
neutral against a specific type of expression transforms the statute itself into a content-
based measure.
46. Id. at 1729.
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clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious
beliefs that motivated [Jack Phillips'] objection.,
47
My focus then is on that side of the Masterpiece Cakeshop
coin. I will not explore and take no position on whether Jack
Phillips is an artist who becomes "an active participant in the
wedding celebration," and, as a result, has a right to refuse to
facilitate it.48 Nor do I wish to contemplate whether wedding
cakes per se convey a message that can properly be attributed to
the baker, speech that Jack Phillips was not obligated to
promulgate. 49 My gut instinct tells me that wedding cakes alone
say nothing about the individuals who created them, much less
their views. I also doubt that bakers have any particular right to
"participate" in the ceremony or subsequent reception, much
less that their mere presence conveys a discemable message.
The fact that Jack Phillips sometimes does so strikes me as
irrelevant. He may well view himself as an "active participant"
and may "sometimes stay[] and interact[] with the guests at the
wedding."50  But I doubt that these voluntary actions confer
some sort of cognizable right to highjack the ceremony,
transforming it from an expression of the celebrants' views into
his own.
My sole focus is then on the Free Exercise claim, assuming
it is one that the Court will eventually address directly and will,
presumably, be tempted to support.51  That said, complexities
lurk. Custom invitations? 52  Flowers? 53  Videos of the
ceremony? 54  The venue and associated services? 55  The free
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1742 (Thomas, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 1743.
50. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1742-43.
51. It is possible that the Court will be receptive to a religious-exemption claim.
Professor Oleske, for example, characterized at least four members of the pre-Kavanaugh
Court "[open] to the argument." See James M. Oleske, Jr., Free Exercise (Dis)Honesty,
Wis. L. REv. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 45), [https://perma.c[/T2BF-FSMT](Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch).
52. See Brush & Nib Studios, LC v. City of Phoenix, 247 Ariz. 269, [] (2019)
("custom wedding invitations, and the process of creating them, are protected by the First
Amendment because they are pure speech").
53. See State of Washington v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203, 1226 (2019)
("The decision to either provide or refuse to provide flowers for a wedding does not
inherently express a message about that wedding.").
54. See Telescope Media Group v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 751 (8th Cir. 2019) ("To be
sure, producing a video requires several actions that, individually, might be mere
Vol. 72:4776
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speech problems posed are myriad, conjuring up echoes of
Justice Potter Stewart's inability to "further define the kinds of
material... to be embraced... [b]ut I know it when I see it." 56
I cheerfully decline to voyage into that realm. My sole
focus, accordingly, is on the Free Exercise claim and I will to
explore whether all parties to the case have considered the full
implications of a possible rule that would, as Professors Thomas
Berg and Douglas Laycock advocated, "protect the liberty of
both sides.",57
II. FREE EXERCISE?
The notion that the law should respect sincerely held
religious beliefs is deeply appealing. There is something
undeniably offensive about government "discriminat[ing]
against individuals or groups because they hold religious views
abhorrent to the authorities."58  One prevailing myth about the
founding is that the Puritans - having fled the persecution of an
established church in England - instilled on these shores a
commitment to religious liberty, believing that "God requireth
not an uniformity of religion to be enacted and enforced in any
civil state." 59  Nothing could be further from the truth. As
Justice Thomas has noted, "[a]t least six States had established
churches in 1789" and three "maintained local-rule
establishments whereby the majority in each town could select
conduct... But what matters for our analysis is that these activities come together to
produce finished videos that are 'medi[a] for the communication of ideas."') (quoting
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952)).
55. See Gifford v. McCarthy, 137 A.D.3d 30, 42 (N.Y. S. Ct. [] 2016) ("reasonable
observers would not perceive the ... provision of a venue and services for a same-sex
wedding ceremony as an endorsement of same-sex marriage").
56. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
57. Brief of Christian Legal Soc'y. ct al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
11, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)
(No. 16-111) [hereinafter Berg & Laycock Brief].
58. Sherbert v. Varner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) (citing Fowler v. Rhode Island,
345 U.S. 67 (1953)); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) ("[T]here are
areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause ... beyond the power of the State to
control, even under regulations of general applicability.").
59. Roger Williams, The Bloody Tenent, Of Persecution for Cause of Conscience,
in V The Founders Constitution at 48, 48 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds. 1987).
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the minister and religious denomination." 60 Having fled the
establishment they disliked, the individuals who settled this
nation were more than happy to set up an establishment that
favored their own faith:
When the Puritans fled from persecution in England,
and planted themselves in America for the purpose of
enjoying religious freedom, it was evidently the freedom of
the church collectively which they sought - not liberty of
conscience to individuals, but the liberty of the church to
exercise, without restraint, all that power over the
consciences of individuals, which they considered
indispensible to preserve the purity of the church. - They
were no more averse to a religious establishment, or the
punishment of heresy, than those of the established church
in England.61
That said, this is not the approach the Court has taken.
Neither Congress, nor an individual state, may "establish" a
church, that is, grant a given sect official status as the "one true
church.",62  In a similar vein, questions regarding "free exercise"
pose significant problems when the choice is whether to act or
simply to believe. The theory is that, per Sherbert v. Varner,"no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable
state interest w[ill] suffice." 63  Rather, a "claim for a religious
exemption must be evaluated under the balancing test set forth
in Sherbert ... [which requires that] governmental actions that
substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a
60. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 575 U.S. 565, 605 (2014) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
61. Daniel Chipman, Preface, I D. Chip. 2, 16 (Vt. 1824).
62. This is neither the time nor place to probe the significance of the fact that the
First Amendment, as incorporated and made applicable against the states, does not declare
that "neither Congress nor thc States shall establish a religion." Rather, it declares that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. Const. amend.
I (emphasis added). That formulation arguably means that those who framed it "saw the
Amendment as designed to prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and perhaps to
prevent discrimination among sects." Wallace v. Jaffrec, 472 U.S. 38, 98 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).Its "real object" is "to prevent any national ecclesiastical
establishment, which should give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national
government." Joseph Story, III Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §
1871 (1833).
63. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
Vol. 72:4778
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compelling governmental interest., 64  But as Justice Antonin
Scalia observed for the Court in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, "[a]ny
society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy," a
"danger [that] increases in direct proportion to the society's
diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or
suppress none of them."65 This does not mean that the beliefs
Mr. Phillips embraces are not protected. "The free exercise of
religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and
profess whatever religious doctrine one desires." 66 The problem
arises, rather, when an individual goes beyond mere belief or
profession and asserts a right to actually act on those beliefs in
the face of what Justice Scalia described as a "valid and neutral
law of general applicability. 67
Smith resurrected a belief/conduct dichotomy first
articulated in 1878 in Reynolds v. United States.68 The question
before the Court was whether George Reynolds, a member of
the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints (the Mormon
Church), could claim the protection of the Free Exercise Clause
in the face of a proscription against plural marriages. Reynolds
averred that "the practice of polygamy was directly enjoined
upon the male members" of the Mormon Church and that "the.
penalty for... failure and refusal would be damnation in the life
to come." 69  The Court held that the free exercise guarantee
protected beliefs, but not conduct. Drawing on the lessons
64. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-83 (1990)
(citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402-03).
65. Id. at 888.
66. Id. at 877.
67. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263n. 3 (1982) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)). As a purely textual matter, there is a
significant problem with all of this, given that the Free Exercise Clause speaks of the
"exercise" of religion, as opposed to its embrace. I leave that to another day, noting only
that the issue is real. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625 (2015)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the Free Exercise Clause protects "the freedom to
'exercise' religion".)
68. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
69. Id. at 161. For a discussion of the Mormon Church's current and past stances on
polygamy, see Plural Marriage in The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, THE
CHURCH Of JESUS CHRIST Or LATTER-DAY SAINTS, [https://perma.cc/Q9A8-AM5R] (noting
that "[b]y revelation, the Lord commanded Joseph Smith to institute the practice of plural
marriage," but that the Church now "believe[s] that the marriage of one man and one
woman is the Lord's standing law of marriage") (last visited Oct. 24, 2019).
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imparted by various founding-era discussions, including the
Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom and statements by
Thomas Jefferson both before and after ratification,7 ° it declared
that "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere
opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in
violation of social duties or subversive of good order." 71 To do
otherwise, it observed, "would be to make the professed
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and
in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.
Government could exist only in name under such
circumstances."
72
Citing and quoting Reynolds with approval, Justice Scalia
declared in Smith that "[s]ubsequent decisions have consistently
held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual
of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes)."' 73 The Court accordingly rejected the assumption
that strict scrutiny should apply when assessing Free Exercise
claims. 74 "[T]he sounder approach, and the approach in accord
with the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the test
inapplicable to such challenges." 75 To do otherwise would be to
create "a private right to ignore generally applicable laws," an
70. Id. at 163-64. The Virginia Statute expressed strong support for "the field of
opinion," but drew the line "when principles break out into overt acts against peace and
good order." Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (Oct. 31, 1785), § 1, in 8 THE PAPERS
Or JAMES MADISON 399, 400 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 1973).
Jefferson, in turn, stated in no uncertain terms "that the legislative powers of government
reach actions only, and not opinions." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptist
Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281, 281 (Andrew A.
Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., Thomas Jefferson Mem'l Assoc. 1905).
71. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
72. Id. at 167; see also Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940)
("Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious
toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the
promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.").
73. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)
(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n. 3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
74. Id. at 885.
75. Id.
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approach Justice Scalia characterized as "a constitutional
anomaly." 76
As the Court subsequently emphasized, "[i]n addressing the
constitutional protection for free exercise of religion, our cases
establish the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of
general applicability need not be justified by a compelling
governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of
burdening a particular religious practice. 77  As Justice David
Souter explained, "[t]he proposition for which the Smith rule
stands... is that formal neutrality, along with general
applicability, are sufficient conditions for constitutionality under
the Free Exercise Clause., 78  In effect, the standard is rational
basis review: the government interest need only be legitimate,
and accommodations for religious beliefs, if any, must come via
the political process. Indeed, "a society that believes in the
negative protection accorded to a religious belief can be
expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as
well." 79
Smith was a narrow decision.80  It was also roundly
criticized.81 Professor Laycock, for example, argued that "[o]ne
function of judicial review is to protect religious exercise
76. Id. at 886. Implicit in this line of analysis is the belief that strict scrutiny is
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv.
1,8(1972).
77. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531
(1993) (citing Smith, 494 U.S. 872).
78. Id. at 563 (Souter, J., concurring).
79. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
80. The vote was 5-4, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and
Kennedy joining the Scalia opinion. Justice O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the
judgement, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Justice Blackmun filed a
dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Id. at 873. See, e.g., id. at 891-92
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgement) (characterizing the Court's holding as a "strained
reading of the First Amendment" and "incompatible with our Nation's fundamental
commitment to individual religious liberty"); id. at 907-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the majority opinion as a "perfunctor[y] dismiss[al]" of a "painstakingly ...
developed.., consistent and exacting standard").
81. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of
Supreme Court-Centrism, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Rvv. 259; Michael W. McConnell, Free
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990); Harry F.
Tepker, Jr., Hallucinations of Neutrality in the Oregon Peyote Case, 16 AM. INOIAN L. REV.
1 (1991). For a sweeping condemnation of both Smith and the Court's current approach to
free exercise claims, see Oleske, supra note 54.
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against ... hostile or indifferent consequences of the political
process. The Court has abandoned that function, at least in
substantial part, and perhaps entirely." 82  Congress agreed,
passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),83
which stipulated that "[g]overnment shall not substantially
burden a person's exercise of religion" absent a showing that
"application of the burden to the person" is the "least restrictive
means" to further "a compelling governmental interest."84 The
Court subsequently rejected this attempt to "decree the
substance of ... the Free Exercise Clause,"85 holding that
Congress could craft remedies for violations but could not alter
the meaning stipulated by the Court.86  "Congress does not
enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is."87
RFRA could serve as a voluntarily agreed-upon limit on the
exercise of federal authority, 88 but it could not and was not
appropriately "designed to identify and counteract state laws
likely to be unconstitutional because of their treatment of
religion." 8
9
These background realities deeply influenced the posture of
Masterpiece Cakeshop. The attorneys for Jack Phillips
recognized that successful pursuit of the Free Exercise claim
would require modification if not outright repudiation of
Smith.90 They accordingly placed most of their emphasis on a
Free Speech claim, arguing principally that "[t]his Court's
82. Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 S. CT. REV. 1, 68
(1990).
83. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1489 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1993)).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-I (1993).
85. City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (applying
RFRA in a case parsing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of42 U.S.C.)).
89. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534-35. Congress subsequently enacted the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000),
which reinstated a strict scrutiny regime for state actions regulating land use and the
"religious exercise" of "institutionalized persons." For a brief history of the cases and
statutes, see Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859-60 (2015).
90. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 7, at 48 n.8 ("If the rules established in Smith




compelled-speech doctrine forbids the Commission from
demanding that artists design custom expression that conveys
ideas they deem objectionable." 91
This attempt to draw a sharp line between speech and
religion is at best misleading. Jack Phillips was not advocating a
constitutional right to refuse service based on a purely speech-
grounded contention that his "custom wedding cakes are his
artistic expression."92 That would amount to a claim of an
actual right to "[d]iscriminat[e] against gay people who
marry, 93 the equivalent of "discrimination 'directed toward gay
persons as a class' [that] cannot be squared with the
Constitution's guarantee of 'equal dignity."' '94  Rather, his
speech claim was inextricably linked to his religion claim, that
for him, "like many adherents of the Abrahamic faiths...
marriage has a 'spiritual significance' ... to the point of being
'sacred."'95
Simply put, the focus is not on speech per se, rather, it is on
inherently religious speech. It is accordingly appropriate to
eschew discussion of the Free Speech issues and focus our
attention on the implications of Jack Phillips' claim that he "did
not want to express ideas that offend his religious convictions
about marriage." 96  The professed goal is to recognize and
protect "[r]obust religious and expressive freedoms [which
arguably] advance pluralism, protect other civil liberties, and
91. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 7, at 15; see also Reply Brief, supra note 24, at 1
("Expressive freedom is central to human dignity. It requires that artists be free to make
their own moral judgments about what to express through their works."). The merits brief
devoted twenty-two pages to the Free Speech claim and only ten to the Free Exercise
claim. The allocation of space was even more lopsided in the Reply Brief, which spent
twenty pages on speech and only three on free exercise. A similar impulse apparently
informed the strategy adopted by the plaintiff in Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869
F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 634 (2019) (No. 18-12). As Justice Alito
noted in his separate statement, "[p]etitioner's decision to rely primarily on his free speech
claims as opposed to... alternative [free exercise] claims may be due to certain decisions
of this Court." Id. at 636 (Alito, J. concurring) (citing Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of
Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) and Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63
(1977)).
92. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 7, at 17.
93. Craig & Mullins Brief, supra note 10, at 43.
94. Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) and Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015)).
95. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 7, at 21 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96
(1987), and Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594).
96. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 7, at 40.
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promote true tolerance and civility. ' 97  The question then is
whether this is a good idea given the "diversity of religious
beliefs [in] 'a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost
every conceivable religious preference.'
98
I. THE CAKE, FIRST LAYER: RELIGION?
Any discussion of the wisdom or viability of "robust"
religious and expressive freedoms must take into account three
realities. The first two are posed by Frazee and Ballard. Every
individual is entitled to invoke the Free Exercise guarantee
based on her or his sincerely held beliefs. These do not need to
be found in the texts or teachings of any recognized religious
sect. Rather, they may be premised simply and solely on that
individual's reading of a sacred text or adherence to a particular
conviction, textual or otherwise. Those beliefs are not, in turn,
subject to question. There are no heresy trials in this nation and
the sole dispositive question for a belief, no matter how divorced
from what many regard as reality, is whether it is sincerely held.
Finally, the field of inquiry is not confined to what Jack Phillips
characterized as the "Abrahamic faiths." 99 Rather, it extends to
the full range of individuals and ideas that prevail in an
increasingly diverse, multicultural nation.
This final point is incredibly important. Professor Laycock,
for example, argued in the wake of Smith that he "would grant
most requests for exemption, because I think the text and
purposes of the Free Exercise Clause require that government
leave religion as free as can be managed in a complex urban
society."100 Most, however, is not all. As Professor William
Marshall has observed,
[m]inority belief systems.., will bear the brunt of the
definition and the sincerity inquiries. A court is more likely
to find against a claimant on definitional grounds when the
religion is bizarre, relative to the cultural norm, and is more
97. Id. at 61.
98. Emp't Div., Dcp't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990)
(quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)); see also United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163,174 (1965) (noting the "richness and variety of spiritual life in our country"
and that at that time "[o]vcr 250 sects inhabit[ed] our land").
99. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 7, at 21.
100. Laycock, supra note 81, at 68.
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likely to find that a religious belief is insincere when the
belief in question is, by cultural norms, incredulous. 101
The answers may - or may not - be clear when the claim
parallels one of Professor Marshall's favorite exemplars, the
Tennessee man who argued that his religious beliefs required
him to dress like a chicken in court.1 °2 So, for example, courts
have rejected attempts to claim religious protection for adherents
from the Church of Marijuana, 10 3 the Church of the Flying
Spaghetti Monster, 10 4 and Veganism, 10 5 at least when it is
divorced from roots in religions like Nazarite Judaism. 10 6  In
each instance, these judgments have been based on problems
associated with the individual claim. 107 That is, they did not
actually hold that, consistent with judicial standards for"establishing the religious nature of [individual] beliefs,"'0 8
there can never be, for example, a Church of the Flying
Spaghetti Monster. Indeed, conceding that the teachings of
Creativity - "the central tenet of which is white supremacy"10 9
- are "simplistic and repugnant to the notion of equality that
101. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 308, 311 (1991).
102. See id. at 311 n. 17 (citing State v. Hodges, 695 S.W.2d 171 (Tenn. 1985)).
The court dismissed his claim as "bizarre," quoting with approval Justice Robert Jackson's
observation that "[t]he price of freedom of religion ... is that we must put up with, and
even pay for, a good deal of rubbish." State v. Hodges, 695 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tenn. 1985)
(quoting Ballard, 322 U.S. at 95 (Jackson, J., dissenting)). The court was likely correct to
reject the claim, given that Mr. Hodges provided scant support for grounding it in any
religious teachings. It is not at all clear, however, given the Frazee and Ballard cases, that
an individual could not in fact believe, as a religious matter, in the need to dress like a
chicken in court.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996).
104. See, e.g., Cavanaugh v. Bartelt, 178 F. Supp. 3d 819 (D. Neb. 2016).
105. See, e.g., Friedman v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
106. See, e.g., Williams v. Annucci, 895 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2018).
107. See, e.g., Meyers, 95 F.3d at 1484 (after "thorough analysis of the indicia of
religion ... we hold that Meyer's beliefs more accurately espouse a philosophy and/or way
of life than a 'religion'); Cavanaugh, 178 F. Supp. 3d at 829 (as advanced and supported
by claimant, "FSMism is not a belief system addressing 'deep and imponderable' matters:
it is... a satirical rejoinder to a certain strain of religious argument"); Friedman, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 685 ("plaintiff alleges a moral and ethical creed limited to the single subject of
highly valuing animal life and ordering one's life based on that perspective").
108. Meyers, 95 F.3d at 1482.
109. Peterson v. Wilmur Commc'n, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1015 (E.D. Wis.
2002).
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undergird the very non-discrimination statute at issue, ' ' 1° one
court held that the adherent in that case "has met his initial
burden of showing that his beliefs constitute a 'religion' for
purposes of Title VII."1 1l  The question was not whether the
beliefs in question were "moral, ethical, or otherwise valid."
'"12
Rather, it was whether "[p]laintiff has shown that Creativity
functions as religion in his life" and "is for him a religion
regardless of whether it espouses goodness or ill.",
1 13
In other words, that which most observers would intuitively
regard as ludicrous or morally intolerable might well merit
religious protection. More to the point, as I demonstrate in Part
IV, the problems I envision are more sweeping. This is not
simply a matter of tolerating arguably bizarre religions and what
many regard as their idiosyncratic beliefs. Many major,
mainstream religions and their texts and tenets provide sincere
believers ample bases for claims that we might otherwise be
inclined to dismiss as outlandish.
The key question is then how and where to draw the line.
The attorneys for Craig and Mullins and for the Colorado
Commission repeatedly posed examples of the wide range of
discriminatory practices that would be sanctioned if Phillips
110. Id. at 1023.
111. Id. at 1022. But see Hale v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 759 Fed. Appx 741 (10th
Cir. 2019) (employing the five-part analysis set forth in Meyers and concluding that
Creativity is not a religion). This is the near universal result. See Todd v. Cal. Dep't of
Corr. and Rehab., No. 1:12-cv-01003-DAD-BAM PC, 2018 WL 3968233 (E.D. Cal. Aug.
16, 2018) (collecting the cases). These decisions generally dismiss Peterson, stating that
"a Title VII claim applies a much broader standard than that employed in the context of the
First Amendment." Id. at *7 n.3. These courts do not, however, analyze these matters in
any detail. Rather, they offer conclusory statements and ignore the extent to which the
Title VII decisions rely on and adopt rules announced in cases like Seeger, grounded in the
First Amendment and articulating general principles rather than Title VII-specific rules.
Indeed, in Peterson the court stressed that 1972 amendments to Title VII were "intended to
make the Title VII religious discrimination analysis the same as the analysis of claims
under the Free Exercise Clause." Peterson, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 1021.
112. Peterson, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 1023. The court stressed that "[b]ased on the
record ... no reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff committed any racially
discriminatory acts." Id. at 1025. The sole dispositive question was that he had in fact
been demoted because of his religion. Id. at 1024-26.
113. Id. at 1024. As part of its analysis the court noted and rejected as "of no
assistance" two earlier decisions holding that the Ku Klux Klan was not a religion. See id.
at 1022 (citing and discussing Slater v. King Soopers, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 10 (D. Colo.
1992) and Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Va. 1973)).
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were to prevail.1 14  But counsel for Phillips largely ignored the
invitation to discuss the full implications of the rule for which
they argued, stating only that "the record in ... case[s] like that
would likely reveal that the cake artist engages in broader class-
based discrimination against certain races."' 1 5
Phillips' supporters want to shift the inquiry from a focus
on the religious belief to the person it targets.'1 16 Their goal is to
avoid the problem posed by Smith by substituting the tests used
for different group classifications for the more relaxed Smith
standard. So, for example, if a given status classification
requires strict scrutiny, then "laws targeting [that classification]
may survive heightened First Amendment scrutiny."'1 17  The
practical effect of this was articulated by the United States,
which argued that "'racial bias' ... poses 'unique historical,
constitutional, and institutional concerns"' that make its
elimination "the most 'compelling' of interests." 18 It then
averred, in the specific contexts of that case, that "[t]he same
cannot be said for opposition to same-sex marriage. "119
114. See, e.g., Craig & Mullins Brief, supra note 10, at 3 (citing refusals "to provide
cakes for an interracial or interfaith couple's wedding, a Jewish boy's bar mitzvah, an
African-American child's birthday, or a woman's business school graduation party"); Brief
for Respondent Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n at 4, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil
Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111) ("a racist baker could refuse to sell
'Happy Birthday' cakes to African-American customers, a screen printer could refuse to
sell a banner announcing a Muslim family's reunion, and a tailor could refuse to sell a gay
man a custom suit for a charity gala"). See also Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal
Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc. in Support of Respondents, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111) (extended discussion of
the history and further potential for racial discrimination "justified" by religious beliefs)
[hereinafter NAACP Brief].
115. Reply Brief, supra note 24, at 15. When pressed at oral argument regarding a
variety of hypotheticals, including race, gender, or disability, counsel again largely avoided
the issue. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 18-24, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111) [hereinafter Masterpiece
Transcript]. For example, when confronted directly about race, counsel responded "[t]his
Court has never compelled speech in the context of race," id. at 20 (emphasis added), an
answer designed to avoid the implications of the Court's condemnation of religiously
motivated discrimination on the basis of race as "patently frivolous" in Newman v. Piggie
Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 404 n.5 (1968).
116. See Masterpiece Transcript, supra note 117, at 23-24.
117. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 32,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No.
16-111) [hereinafter United States Brief].
118. Id. (quoting Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017) and Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983)).
119. Id.
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But it is not at all clear that this is what matters when the
question, properly posed, is not discrimination on the basis of
group identity but rather whether government has "impose[d]
special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious
status." 120  The argument for Jack Phillips is that religion is
special, worthy of protection even in the face of Smith's refusal
to accord it the heightened protection normally applied to
"specific prohibition[s] of the Constitution, such as those of the
first ten amendments."' 12 1  I leave to another time and place
whether attaining that goal requires modification of repudiation
of Smith. 122 Rather, I want to explore just how far we should be
willing to go in the light of the myriad possibilities posed by an
approach to Free Exercise if "[w]hat matters for identifying
burdens on religious liberty is the religious claimant's
understanding.
'123
IV. THE CAKE, SECOND LAYER: RACE AND
GENDER
The most obvious problem is posed by race, in particular
the so-called Curse of Ham or Noah's Curse.' 24 Rooted in the
biblical story of Noah condemning his son for "s[eeing] the
nakedness of his father,"'125 the Curse of Ham is the most
120. Smith, 494 U.S. 877.
121. Id. at 888-89; United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938).
122. I also forgo any discussion of whether Justice Alito's separate statement on the
denial of review in Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2017), cert.
denied, 139 S.Ct. 634 (2019), which was joined by Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and
Kavanaugh, signals that at least four members of the Court are now ready to revisit that
opinion.
123. Berg & Laycock Brief, supra note 55, at 17. Accord, Frederick M. Gedicks,
"Substantial" Burdens: How Courts May (and Why They Must) Judge Burdens on Religion
Under RFRA, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 94, 130-31 (2017) ("what matters is not whether the
court finds a claimant's understanding of theological consequences credible, but whether
the claimant does").
124. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Noah's Curse: How Religion Often Conflates
Status, Belief and Conduct to Resist Antidiscrimination Norms, 35 GA. L. REV. 657, 667
(2011).
125. Genesis 9:22. All citations to and quotations from the Christian Bible are
taken from THE NEW OXFORD ANNOTATED BIBLE: NEW REVISED STANDARD VERSION
WITH THE APOCRYPHA (Michael D. Coogan ed., 2018). In virtually every instance, with
slight changes in the wording, the prohibitions found in that work are repeated in THE
JEWISH STUDY BIBLE (Adele Berlin & Marc Zvi Brettler eds., 2004). Compare, for
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common religious source for those seeking to discriminate on
the basis of race, "a general indictment of the Hamite race,
namely, persons of African descent."'126  While the doctrine in
now primarily associated with certain strains of fundamentalist
Christianity, in particular those that tried to justify slavery in the
Old South, 127 both Judaism and Islam have been associated with
those arguing for its existence and racial implications. 128 Some
scholars question whether the statements in Genesis actually
targeted members of the African nations and race. 129 That really
does not matter. Ballard counsels that we respect the sincere
beliefs of any individual who reads that Book, where Isaac tells
Jacob that "[y]ou shall not marry one of the Canaanite
women," 130 with adherents concluding that this targets "persons
of African descent.'
13 1
example, the condemnation of "mixed" marriages in the Oxford version, Deuteronomy 7:3
("Do not intermarry with them, giving your daughters to their sons or taking their
daughters for your sons.") with the same passage in the Jewish text ("You shall not
intermarry with them: do not give your daughters to their sons or take their daughters for
your sons.").
126. Eskridge, supra note 127, at 667.
127. See e.g., STEPHEN R. HAYNES, NOAH'S CURSE: THE BIBLICAL JUSTIFICATION
OF AMERICAN SLAVERY (2002). The Mormon Church also embraced this, with Brigham
Young stating that "[t]he seed of Canaan will inevitably carry the curse which was placed
upon them until the same authority, which placed it there, shall see proper to have it
removed." Brigham Young, Speech to the Joint Session of the Legislative Assembly, Jan.
5, 1852, quoted in Newell G. Bringhurst, The Mormons and Slavery: A Closer Look, 50
PAC. HIST. REV. 329, 336 (1981). For a general treatment of Mormon views, see NEWELL
G. BRINGHURST, SAINTS, SLAVES, AND BLACKS: THE CHANGING PLACE OF BLACK
PEOPLE WITHIN MORMONISM (1981).
128. See e.g., David N. Goldenberg, The Curse of Ham: A Case of Rabbinic
Racism?, in STRUGGLES IN THE PROMISED LAND: TOWARDS A HISTORY OF BLACK-
JEWISH RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (Jack Salzman & Cornel West eds., 1997).
Goldenberg notes that "[t]he proposition that ancient Jewish society invented anti-Black
racism was first stated about thirty years ago and has been increasingly repeated in
scholarly and nonseholarly works of all sorts." Id. at 22. He disputes the account,
declaring that "the five Jewish texts reputed to show anti-Black racism actually present an
entirely different picture." Id. at 31. He also traces, but largely does not dispute, Islamic
sources, stating that "[f]rom the seventh century onwards the concept appears as a
recurring theme among Islamic writers who tightly link blackness and slavery." Id. at 33.
For a lengthy and detailed dicussion, see DAVID M. GOLDBERG, THE CURSE OF HAM:
RACE AND SLAVERY IN EARLY JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY, AND ISLAM 142-93 (2005).
129. See, e.g., 0. Palmer Robertson, Current Critical Questions Concerning the
"Curse of Ham'" (Gen. 9:20-27), 41 J. OF THE EVANGELICAL THEOLOGICAL SOC'Y 177,
177 (1998) ("It might be assumed that social advancements in the twentieth century have
put to rest this rather twisted way of reading Scripture.").
130. Genesis 28:1. For a more general condemnation of "mixed" marriages, see
Deuteronomy 7:3-4 ("Do not intermarry with them, giving your daughters to their sons or
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As the NAACP reminded the Masterpiece Cakeshop Court,
"[w]hile justifying racial discrimination on the basis of religion
might seem outlandish or offensive today, the unfortunate truth
is that those sorts of arguments were once common." 132 They
also have staying power.1 33  Three relatively recent cases
illustrate the point: Loving v. Virginia,134 which focused on
interracial marriage; Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,
Inc. ,135 which involved discrimination in places of public
accommodation; and Bob Jones University v. United States,
136
which examined whether schools that engage in racially
discriminatory practices should enjoy tax-exempt status. Two of
the three are arguably of marginal value for present purposes,
for in neither did the Court directly confront, much less discuss,
the nature and implications of a Free Exercise claim. The third,
in turn, treats the issue in a cursory and conclusory manner.
The Court did note in Loving that the trial court judge, in
assessing the propriety of Virginia's ban on interracial marriage,
declared:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow,
malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents.
And but for the interference with his arrangement there
would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he
separated the races shows that he did not intend for the
races to mix. 13
7
taking their daughters for your sons, for that would turn away your children from following
me, to serve other gods."; 2 Corinthians 6:17-18 ("Therefore come out from them, and be
separate from them, says the Lord, and touch nothing unclean; then I will welcome you,
and I will be your father, and you shall be my sons and daughters, says the Lord
Almighty.").
131. Eskridge, supra note 127, at 667.
132. NAACP Brief, supra note 116, at 5. The brief provides a good survey of the
cases, in particular the many state court decisions invoking religion as a justification for
bans on interracial marriage. For a general defense of the notion that both the Old and
New Testaments teach racial segregation, see HUMPHREY K. EZELL, THE CHRISTIAN
PROBLEM OF RACIAL SEGREGATION 13-22 (1959). For a discussion of the centrality of
religious sanction of slavery in secession and the Civil War, see MITCHELL SNAY, GOSPEL
OF DISUNION: RELIGION AND SEPARATION IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 54-57 (1993).
133. See infra notes 137-39 and accompanying discussion.
134. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
135. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
136. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
137. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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This was the sole reference to religion and the Court never
directly addressed this aspect of the case. It focused instead on
two independent constitutional bases for invalidating the
Virginia statute. Noting that the Equal Protection Clause
required that the interracial marriage ban be subjected to "the
most rigid scrutiny," 138 the Court declared that "[t]here is
patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of
invidious racial discrimination which justifies this
classification." 139 The Due Process Clause in turn provided a
second basis for repudiation: "To deny this fundamental
freedom on so unsupportable basis as [a] racial
classification[] .. . is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of
liberty without due process of law., 140 Free exercise of religion
was simply not discussed.
The second relatively contemporaneous example came in
Piggie Park Enterprises, where the proprietor of five drive-in
restaurants and a sandwich shop maintained that "the [Civil
Rights] Act [of 1964] violates his freedom of religion under the
First Amendment 'since his religious beliefs compel him to
oppose any integration of the races whatever. '"'141 The District
Court rejected that argument, declaring that the defendants were
entitled to their beliefs, but they do "not have the absolute right
to exercise and practice such beliefs in utter disregard of the
clear constitutional rights of other citizens. ' ' 142 The district court
also held that only one of the six businesses met the
jurisdictional requirements of the Act, a determination that was
reversed on appeal in an opinion within which the religious
bases for refusing service was neither mentioned nor
discussed. 143
The Supreme Court then granted review for the sole
purpose of considering whether the plaintiffs could recover
attorneys fees, which it held they could. 144 Neither religion nor
Free Exercise were mentioned in the opinion itself. Rather, it
138. Id. at 11 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 12.
141. Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 941, 944 (D.S.C. 1966).
142. Id. at 945.
143. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 377 F.2d 433, 434-37 (4th Cir. 1967).
144. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-03 (1968).
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relegated the merits of the defendants' claims to a footnote,
where it declared only that "respondents interposed defenses
[were] so patently frivolous that a denial of counsel fees to
petitioners would be manifestly inequitable."'1 45 That conclusion
may have great appeal, but it is surely at odds with Ballard's
central lesson, that "the thing the Constitution put[s] beyond...
reach... for the price of freedom of religion or of speech or of
the press is that we must put up with, and even pay for, a good
deal of rubbish.,
146
The final example is Bob Jones University. Two private
institutions were involved: Bob Jones University, which
admitted African American students but banned interracial
dating and marriage, and the Goldsboro Christian Schools,
which had a racially discriminatory admissions system. 147 The
issue for the Court was whether either could qualify as a tax-
exempt organization. Most of the its opinion focused on
whether the two fulfilled the "public benefit principle," which
requires that "the purpose of a charitable [organization] not be
illegal or violate established public policy."'1 48 The Court held
that they did not meet that standard, stating that "[g]iven the
stress and anguish of the history of efforts to escape from the
shackles of the 'separate but equal' doctrine ... it cannot be said
that educational institutions that, for whatever reasons, practice
racial discrimination, are institutions exercising 'beneficial and
stabilizing influences in community life.""' 149 The Court also
rejected the Free Exercise claim, stating that "the Government
has a fundamental, overriding interest is eradicating racial
discrimination in education,"'1 50 an interest that barred receipt of
the tax exemption "but will not prevent those schools from
145. Id. at 402 n.5.
146. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
147. Both based their policies on their reading of the Bible. See Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 580 (1983) ("The sponsors of the University genuinely
believe that the Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage."); id. at 583 ("Goldsboro
Christian Schools has maintained a racially discriminatory admissions policy based on its
interpretation of the Bible."). Given Frazee, it is worth noting that "Bob Jones University
is not affiliated with any religious denomination, but is dedicated to the teaching and
propagation of its fundamentalist Christian religious beliefs." Id. at 580.
148. Id. at 591.
149. Id. at 595 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) and quoting Walz v.
Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970)).
150. Id. at 604.
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observing their religious tenets.' 15 1 In other words, it left the
beliefs unquestioned, allowing both institutions to observe them
while simply and only denying them the added benefit of the tax
exemption they had previously enjoyed.
These three cases have been routinely cited for the
proposition that "[t]he overarching lesson ... is that [the
Supreme Court] has repeatedly and unambiguously rejected
religious-based justifications for differential treatment. ' 152  But
it is not at all clear that any of the three directly addressed the
issues posed by Jack Phillips and avoided in Masterpiece
Cakeshop: whether government can "devalue[] religious
reasons for declining [a] request" to provide services and
whether "religious beliefs ... [can be] discriminatory in and of
themselves."' 53 Don't get me wrong. I do not for a moment
believe that the Court, even if it takes a post-Brett Kavanaugh
sharp turn to the right, will sanction religiously motivated
discrimination on the basis of race. As the United States
observed in its brief supporting Jack Phillips, "[a] State's,
'fundamental, overriding interest' in eliminating private racial
discrimination-conduct that 'violates deeply and widely
accepted views of elementary justice'-may justify even those
applications of a public accommodations law that infringe on
First Amendment freedoms." 154
That said, the problems posed by such claims are more
complex than the simple notion that they should be rejected
because they would amount to "an objection to the person,' 155 as
opposed to, for example, an "objection to the message being
conveyed.,156  More to the point, assuming we are willing to
151. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 603-04.
152. NAACP Brief, supra note 116, at 15.
153. See Petitioners Brief, supra note 7, at 43.
154. United States Brief, supra note 120, at 32 (emphasis added) (quoting Bob
Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 592, 604). I don't know what to make of the government's
equivocation-"may" rather than "must"-and if it presages a willingness to tolerate
discrimination of the basis of race if the impetus is a sincere religious belief. More to the
point, the fact that such views are "deeply and widely accepted" does not mean they are
universally embraced, much less that the sincerely religiously motivated individual agrees
with them.
155. Masterpiece Transcript, supra note 117, at 21. The statement was made by
Kristen Waggoner, counsel for Jack Phillips, in response to a question from Justice Sonia
Sotomayor, asking if free speech or free exercise claims could "trump" public
accommodation laws. Ms. Waggoner responded, "[t]hat is not my theory." Id.
156. Id. at 22.
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assign condemnation of racial discrimination unique status in
our constitutional system, how do we distinguish other
religiously motivated claims given religions express
constitutional status?
Gender is, of course, the next most likely source of
difficulty. Religious bases for discriminating against women in
a variety of ways are legion. Women per se can plausibly be
viewed as evil, given that "[f]rom a woman sin had its
beginning, and because of her we all die."' 157 What about a wife,
making decisions or engaging in activities without the
participation or consent of her husband? "Christ is the head of
every man, and the husband is the head of his wife."' 58 What
about a woman who has borne no children, since they "will be
saved through childbearing, provided they continue in faith and
love and holiness, with modesty"? 159  Women teachers,
especially those who have men for students? "I permit no
woman to teach or to have authority over a man; she is to keep
silent."'160  Any woman who is not subject to a man? "In
childhood, a woman must be subject to her father; in youth to
her husband; when her lord is dead, to her son; a woman must
never be independent."' 61 A widow? "After the death of her
husband, to preserve her chastity, or to ascend the pile after
him."' 62 Indeed, what about single men? "Any man who has no
wife is no proper man; for it is said, Male and female created He
them and called their name Adam."' 163 A man who owns no
land? "Any man who owns no land is not a proper man; for it is
157. Ecclesiasticus 25:24; see also 1 Timothy 2:13-14 ("For Adam was formed first,
then Eve; and Adam was not deceived, but the woman was deceived and became a
transgressor").
158. 1 Corinthians 11:3; see also Titus 2:5 (women should be "submissive to their
husbands, so that the word of God may not be discredited"); Ephesians 5:22-23 ("Wives,
be subject to your husbands as you are to the Lord. For the husband is head of the wife just
as Christ is the head of the church, the body of which he is the Savior.").
159. 1 Timothy 2:15.
160. 1 Timothy 2:12.
161. The Laws of Manu, in 25 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST 169,195 (F. Max
Muller ed., Oxford at the Clarendon Press) (1886).
162. The Institutes of Vishnu, in 7 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST 110, 111 (F.
Max Muller ed., Oxford at the Clarendon Press) (1886).
163. Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Yebamoth, HALAKHAH Folio 63a,
[https://perma.cc/UZ73-4Z5Y](last visited Oct. 25, 2019). See also Genesis 2:18 ("Then




said, the heavens are the heavens of the Lord; but the earth hath
he given to the children of men."' 64
These are just a few of the many possibilities. And they are
consistent with a historic record within which the belief in
"[w]omen's secondary status often was rooted in genuinely held
religious beliefs about sex-based hierarchy and women's role
within the family." 165 As Justice Joseph P. Bradley infamously
observed, "[t]he paramount destiny and mission of woman are to
fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is
the law of the Creator."' 166 This may have been an acceptable
approach then, but hopefully not now. Distinctions drawn on
the basis of gender, especially those grounded in discriminatory
stereotypes, are strongly disfavored and subjected to a form of
heightened scrutiny within which the question is whether the
government has an "exceedingly persuasive justification," which
means "at least" that the classification "serves 'important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means
employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives. "-167
Various attempts have been made to designate the interest
required in gender cases as "compelling," relying on statements
that have used that term to characterize the interest in
eradicating discrimination of the basis of gender. For example,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor observed in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees that "acts of invidious discrimination in the
distribution of publicly available goods, services, and other
advantages cause unique evils that government has a compelling
interest to prevent - wholly apart from the point of view such
conduct may transmit."' 168 It may well be that it is appropriate to
describe the nature of the interest required as "compelling"
rather than simply "important." But that does not transform the
applicable standard from intermediate to strict scrutiny. As the
164. See Babylonian Talmud, supra note 171, at Folio 63a..
165. Brief of the National Women's Law Ctr. and Other Grps. in Support of
Respondents at 3, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct.
1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
166. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
concurring).
167. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
168. 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984).
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Court has stressed, its treatment of these matters has not"equat[ed] gender classifications, for all purposes, to
classifications based on race or national origin."
1'69
Regardless, this approach once again attempts to shift the
focus from the religious belief espoused to the party against
whom it is directed. It also elides over one of the key reasons
why the Court has not embraced a strict scrutiny regime for
gender classifications: the inescapable reality that there are in
fact differences between men and women that can and should
matter. In Michael M. v. Superior Court, 170 for example, the
Court sustained a California statutory rape measure that
punished men but not women, given the professed state interest
in preventing pregnancies. 171 In a similar vein, in Rostker v.
Goldberg, the Court held that the fact that women were not
eligible for combat duty meant that they were not required to
register for the draft. 172 On what basis then do we denigrate or
invalidate sincere religious beliefs that there are in fact stark
differences between men and women that religious adherents are
bound to respect?
I am wholly in sympathy with the notion that free exercise
should not serve as a justification for invidious discrimination,
even as I struggle with the reality posed by Smith: that we
cannot allow every person to become a law unto her- or himself.
Like many academics, I was initially appalled by that decision.
I taught it as the unfortunate portion of a bad news/good news
duo given the Court's subsequent insistence that the laws
applied to such matters must in fact be neutral and generally
applicable. 173 These views have changed, as I contemplate the
169. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532.
170. 450 U.S.464 (1981).
171. Id. at 470 ("The justification for the statute offered by the State, and accepted
by the Supreme Court of California, is that the legislature sought to prevent illegitimate
teenage pregnancies.").
172. 453 U.S. 57, 76-78 (1981). The fact that women may now serve in combat
roles, and have done so, casts doubt on the continuing viability of the Court's decision that
a male-only selective service system is constitutional and two courts have so held. See
Kyle-Labell v. Selective Serv. Sys., 364 F. Supp. 3d 394 (D.N.J. 2019); Nat'l Coal. for
Men v. Selective Serv. Sys., 355 F. Supp. 3d 568 (S.D. Tex. 2019). That said, I for one
doubt very much that Congress will require women to register or that today's Court would
not afford "substantial deference" to that judgment.
173. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
532 (1993). As Justice Kennedy observed for the Court, the "protections of the Free
Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious
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lessons of Frazee and Ballard and struggle with the myriad
ways in which a single individual can invoke religious beliefs as
a basis for treating people in ways that violate basic norms.
Moreover, I am not the Court, and it is far from clear that a
majority of the current Justices would be inclined to take a more
stringent path given the observation in Masterpiece Cakeshop
that "religious and philosophical objections ... are protected
views and in some instances protected forms of expression." '174
Thus, while it is the "general rule that such objections do not
allow business owners and other actors in the economy and in
society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and
services under a neutral and generally applicable public
accommodations law,"'175 the question remains: how (if at all)
do we determine which "religious beliefs and persons are...
fully welcome in [our] business communit[ies]?' ' 176
A rule based on the standard of review that is used to assess
claims of discrimination against recognized protected groups
may provide a good initial point of departure. But what do we
do with an important subtheme in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the
reality that Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins were able to get
married and to secure a cake from another source? Is it
appropriate to craft an approach that would excuse an individual
vendor if the couple is able to be married in a religious
ceremony elsewhere? 177  Or if there are other places in the
community willing and able to provide the goods and services
requested? Professors Berg and Laycock, for example, maintain
that "[c]ouples who obtain their cake from another baker still get
to live their own lives by their own values. They will still
celebrate their wedding, still love each other, still be married,
and still have their occupations or professions."' 178
beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons." Id.
at 532. In such instances, strict scrutiny applies.
174. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727
(2018).
175. Id. (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Entr, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968)).
176. Id. at 1729.
177. While not stipulated in the briefs, "[a] pastor officiated [t]he wedding" of Craig
and Mullins in Massachusetts and they "exchanged vows and rings just as they'd do any
religious wedding." Email from Kristen Waggoner, Alliance Defending Freedom, to
author (Sept. 22, 2018) (on file with author).
178. Berg & Laycock Brief, supra note 55, at 32.
2020 797
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW
This line of argument was intimated but not pursued in
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States."7 9 In its merits
brief, the motel stressed that the "testimony" below "was totally
lacking in the enumeration of the many hotels in the Southeast
who had accepted Negroes as well as white guests long before
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."' 180 But the motel
did not formally argue for a "comprehensive marketplace"
exception and the Court did not address the issue. Rather, it
stressed that "Negroes in particular have been subject to
discrimination in transient accommodations, having to travel
great distances to secure the same; that often they have been
unable to obtain accommodations and have had to call upon
friends to put them up overnight." 181 In a similar vein, there was
no attempt to argue that there were other places where African
Americans could dine in Katzenbach v. McClung.18 2 The Court
did note that "discriminatory practices prevent Negroes from
buying prepared food served on the premises while on a trip,
except in isolated and unkempt restaurants and under the most
unsatisfactory and often unpleasant conditions."' 83 But the main
focus in that case was whether Ollie's Barbecue met the
jurisdictional predicates in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in
particular the extent to which "it serves or offers to serve
interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it
serves ... has moved in interstate commerce." 184
I would not like to think that the Court would accept the
argument that the availability of alternate sources of goods and
service relieves a particular vendor of its legal obligations. That
would certainly undermine two central purposes of the various
civil rights acts and public accommodations laws: the need to
ensure "society the benefits of wide participation in political,
economic, and cultural life,"'185 and the "vindicat[ion]... of
179. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
180. Petition for Appellant at 20, Heart of Atl. Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964) (No. 515).
181. Id. at 252-53.
182. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
183. Id. at 300.
184. Id. at 298 ((quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964 2 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2), (3)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
185. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1983).
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personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access
to public establishments."'1
86
Then again, who knows? Especially given the hints
dropped by Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Thomas, in his dissent from the denial of a writ of
certiorari in Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman.187 That case involved a
Washington State rule that required pharmacies to "stock
emergency contraceptives, such as Plan B, that can 'inhibit
implantation' of a fertilized egg."18 8 Stormans is a corporation
owned and run by a family with a strong religious "conviction
that life begins at conception and that preventing the uterine
implantation of a fertilized egg is tantamount to abortion. '189
The regulations expressly forbid an exception on religious
grounds and the Stormans argued that this violated their Free
Exercise rights. The District Court agreed.' 90  The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 19' Applying the relaxed
Smith standard, it held that "the rules are neutral and generally
applicable and... further the State's interest in patient
safety."''
92
The key element in all of this for current purposes is the
practice of "facilitated referral," a routine undertaking by
pharmacies that do not carry a drug that one of their customer's
needs. As Justice Alito stressed in his dissent from the denial of
review, "[t]he drugs [in question] are stocked by more than 30
other pharmacies within five miles of fStormans]."1 93  As a
result, "[b]ecause of the practice of facilitated referrals, none of
Ralph's customers has ever been denied timely access to
emergency contraceptives." '1 94 There is no way to tell if he and
his colleagues found the facilitated referral aspect of the case
potentially dispositive. Justice Alito also raised other significant
questions about the result below that have particular resonance
186. Heart of Atl. Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) ((quoting S.
REP. No. 872, at 15-18, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) ) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
187. 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016).
188. Id. at 2433.
189. Id.
190. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
191. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015).
192. Id. at 1071.
193. Id. at 2433 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
194. Id. at 2434.
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in the light of Masterpiece Cake. For example, he questioned
whether the rules were indeed neutral and whether they granted
secular exemptions but refused to grant a religious one. 195 But
the extensive discussion of a broad marketplace principle in both
the Alito dissent and the lower court opinions is nevertheless of
extraordinary interest, especially given the replacement of
Justices Scalia and Kennedy by, respectively, Justices Gorsuch
and Kavanaugh. 
196
Finally, what do we do when the Court has not recognized
a given set of individuals or given practices as ones that merit
heightened scrutiny protection? As matters currently stand, we
do not know for a fact whether same-sex relationships and
conduct get at least intermediate if not strict scrutiny. That
result, in a properly presented case, seemed likely while Justice
Kennedy was on the Court. Odds for that are now arguably
diminished in the wake of his retirement and replacement by
Justice Kavanaugh. Regardless, homosexuality of any sort is
widely condemned in religious texts. "[T]he LORD rained on
Sodom and Gomorrah sulfur and fire from the LORD out of
heaven; and he overthrew those cities, and all of the Plain, and
all the inhabitants of the cities, and what grew on the ground."' 97
That disapproval extends to all of those who have "in the same
manner as they [in Sodom and Gomorrah] indulged in sexual
immorality and pursued unnatural lust, serve as an example by
undergoing a punishment of eternal fire."'1 98 Indeed, what about
anyone who has sex outside of a marriage of one man and one
woman? "Do you not know that wrongdoers will not inherit the
kingdom of God? Do not be deceived! Fornicators, idolaters,
195. See id. at 2436-40
196. Justice Scalia did not participate in the Stormans case, having passed away the
previous February. Justice Gorsuch in turn had not yet been confirmed when the writ was
denied. It is also worth noting that Justice Kennedy did not at that time seem much
concerned about arguably anti-religion sentiments that were present in the record,
sentiments and statements that closely tracked those he found objectionable in Masterpiece
Cakeshop. See, e.g., id. at 2434 (quoting Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1178,
1172 (W.D. Wash. 2012)) ("The district court found that the regulations were adopted with
'the predominant purpose' to 'stamp out the right to refuse' to dispense emergency





adulterers, male prostitutes, sodomites... none of these will
inherit the kingdom of God."'199
There are then ample religious justifications for refusing to
serve or accommodate individuals on the basis of race or gender.
These are not confined to creeds that are at least arguably
outliers, like Creativity.2 0 0  Sincere adherents to such beliefs
might well accordingly expect the courts to recognize their
preferences and give them legal force. I for one doubt that this
will become the rule. It will nevertheless require more than we
have been given to date to justify carving out such exceptions.
IV. FROSTING ON THE CAKE: ALL THE SPITES
THAT MIGHT PLAGUE MANKIND
The problems posed by the spectre of discrimination based
on race and gender are serious and potentially intractable. It is
one thing to say that disparate treatment on these bases is
invidious. "There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color
[and gender]-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal
before the law. 201 It is quite another to tell the sincere religious
adherent that our commitment to these precepts means that she
or he must risk "damnation in the life to come., 20 2
These concerns are even more profound for the as-yet
unresolved issue of what standard should apply to discrimination
based on sexual orientation or sexual status. The Court itself has
not resolved this question. Various lower courts have suggested
that some form of heightened scrutiny is appropriate. 0 3 That
seems both obvious and correct and the realities posed by the
facts of Masterpiece Cakeshop counsel that at least intermediate
scrutiny is called for. But we do not as yet know the answer.
And changes in the composition of the Court may not bode well
for those determined to eradicate the stain of religious and social
forces that purportedly "love the sinner, but hate the sin," even
argue for social policies and criminal laws that consign these
199. 1 Corinthians 6:9-10.
200. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
201. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
202. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161 (1878) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
203. See Wolfv. Walker, 986 F.Supp.2d 953, 1014 (W.D. Wis. 2014).
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individuals to the margins of society and deny "the humanity
and integrity of homosexual persons."
20 4
These problems are compounded when we realize and
acknowledge that there are innumerable other bases for
religious-based discrimination lurking in various religious texts
and the minds of those who read them. It is important to
recognize, of course, that any such claims must be assessed in
the light of the reality that public accommodations statutes and
regulations are exceptions to a general rule that many, but not
all, businesses and vendors have a right to refuse service. 20 5 As
Justice Holmes observed regarding the difference between
"public utilities" and "businesses generally,"
[i]t is true that all business, and for the matter of that,
every life in all its details, has a public aspect, has a public
aspect, some bearing upon the welfare of the community in
which it is passed. But however it may have been in earlier
days as to the common callings, it is assumed in our time
that an invitation to the public to buy does not necessarily
entail an obligation to sell. It is assumed that an ordinary
shop keeper may refuse his wars arbitrarily to a customer
whom he dislikes, and although that consideration is not
conclusive... it is assumed that such a calling is not public
as the word is used.206
Public accommodations measures are, accordingly,
designed to carve out an exception when "any [] business" offers
"sales" or "services." 207 They also tend to specify particular
"individual[s]" or "group[s]" that will be protected.20 8 Jack
Phillips and his business, Masterpiece Cakeshop, met
Colorado's definition of a place of public accommodation and
were subject to that state's bar on discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. That same situation - express statements
204. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015).
205. I am indebted to Professor Andrew Koppelman for reminding me of this rather
obvious reality and prompting revisions that take it into account.
206. Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, Newman, and Brownlow, Comm'rs, 241 U.S.
252, 256 (1916) (citation omitted). For a dated but exhaustive canvas of the common law
rules and the "modern" exceptions for garden-variety businesses, see Alfred Avins, What Is
a Place of "Public" Accommodation?, 52 MARQ. L. REv. 1 (1968).
207. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(1) (2014).
208. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (specifying discrimination on the basis of




regarding who or what is protected - may or may not be present
in many of the situations I am about to discuss. To the extent
they are, religion-based claims that the prohibition should not
apply pose significant problems. But even where the statutory
grounds are not implicated, a potential religious-based claim
should give us pause. What should our approach be if, as
Professor Koppelman suggests, we do indeed live in a society
that "tolerates idiosyncratic discrimination" but treats
"[p]ervasive prejudice [a]s different., 20 9  I agree that our
lodestar should be "the project of transforming culture to
eradicate the notion that some classes of persons are beings of
an inferior order who have no rights."2 10 But I also worry about
the implications of a constitutional regime within which we
must protect "religious views" that "might seem incredible, if
not preposterous, to most people." 211
I am not arguing, for example, that there are jurisdictions
within which it is now illegal to discriminate against individuals
with tattoos or body piercings.212 Or that there will be a mass
impetus to do so if the Court sanctions religious-based
exceptions to neutral laws of general applicability. Rather, I am
asking us to recognize and account for the myriad possibilities
posed by any such rule, and to reflect on how we might go about
the business of deciding "which ideas are so odious as to be
intolerable? ' 2 13  On what bases - if any - should the sincere
religious adherent be able to claim that she or he is simply
expressing a "reasonable" desire to "accept some customers and
reject others on purely personal grounds"? 214 On what bases, if
any, might we be tempted to decide that a particular religious
claim is not in fact reasonable, and therefore not within even the
exceedingly generous standard that arguably governs day-to-day
business transactions?
215
209. Andrew Koppelman, The Joys of Mutual Contempt, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.
LGBT RIGHTS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMON GROUND 111, 112 (William N.
Eskridge & Robin F. Wilson eds., 2019).
210. Id.
211. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
212. See infra text accompanying note 268-73.
213. See Koppelman, supra note 227, at 113.
214. Williams v. Howard Johnson's Inc. of Wash., 210 F. Supp. 295, 297 (E.D. Va.
1962).
215. Recall, for example, the Court's claim that even under the non-standard
standard of "rational basis review," government actions targeting individuals on the basis
2020 803
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW
What exactly do I have in mind? What are the many
possibilities that various religious tenets pose?
What about any person of another faith? "[F]or you shall
worship no other God, because the LORD, who name is Jealous,
is a jealous God., 2 16  Christians? "It is they whom God has
rejected; and he whom God rejects shall find none to succor
him., 217 Jews? "Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees. ... [Y]ou
testify against yourselves that you are the descendants of those
who murdered the prophets. Fill up, then, the measure of your
ancestors. You snakes, you brood of vipers! How can you
escape being sentenced to hell?, 218 Both Jews and Christians?
"Oh you who have attained the faith! Do not take the Jews and
the Christians for your allies: they are but allies of one another -
and whoever of you allies himself with them, becomes, verily,
one of them; behold, God does not guide such evildoers.
'"219
Atheists? "And many human beings [submit to God
consciously], whereas many [others, having defied Him], will
inevitably have to suffer [in the life to come]. 22 ° Indeed, "[b]ut
as for him who rejects belief [in God] - in vain will be all his
works: for in the life to come he shall be among the lost.
221
What about any "mixed" marriage, given that "[w]e abhor
all unlawful mixtures, and that which is practised by against
nature as wicked and impious. '222 Those who pursue another's
wife? "Metal-toothed, huge bodies, blazing fearsome females,
embracing him, feed on the one who steals another's wife.,
223
In particular, "[s]hun fornication! Every sin that a person
of sexual orientation and mental disability were invalid. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996); City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
216. Exodus 34:14.
217. Qur'an 4:52. Excerpts from the Qur'an arc taken from THE MESSAGE OF THE
QUR'AN: THE FULL ACCOUNT OF THE REVEALED ARABIC TEXT ACCOMPANIED BY
PARALLEL TRANSLITERATION (Muhammad Asad trans., The Book Foundation 2003).
218. Matthew 23: 29, 31-33.
219. Qur'an 5:51.
220. Qur'an 22:22-23.
221. Qur'an 5:5. In effect, this and the previous several examples pose the ironic
situation that public accommodations proscriptions against discrimination on the basis of
religion will collide with sincere religion-based motives for discriminating.
222. Apostolic Constitutions 6:11. See CONSTITUTIONS OF THE HOLY APOSTLES,
OR, THE APOSTOLIC CONSITUTIONS, 95-96 (James Donaldson ed., Codex Spiritualis
Publ'n, n.d.) (390 A.D.).
223. Secondary Nirayas [Hells], in BUDDHIST SCRIPTURES 7, 8 (Donald S. Lopez,
Jr. ed., Penguin Books, 2004).
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commits is outside the body; but the fornicator sins against the
body itself'? 224  Then there is the sweeping admonition "[d]o
not commit adultery. Do not have sex with children. Do not be
sexually promiscuous." 225 People who have secured abortion, or
practice birth control techniques that many equate with that
procedure? "Do not abort a child or kill babies."226
What about photographers, videographers, and others who
wish to or have made "graven" images? "You shall make for
yourselves no idols and erect no carved images or pillars, and
you shall not place figured stones in your land, to worship at
them; for I am the Lord, your God., 227 Magicians, witches, or
warlocks? "You shall not practice augury or witchcraft., 228
Fortune tellers? "[T]he divining of the future [is] but a
loathsome evil of Satan's doing." 229 What about "thieves, the
greedy, drunkards, revilers, [and] robbers, none of whom will
inherit the kingdom of God"? 230 Drunkards and gamblers?
"They will ask thee about intoxicants and games of chance.
Say: 'In both there is great evil as well as some benefit for man;
but the evil which they cause is greater than the benefit which
they bring. "231
People with significant amounts of possessions or
property? "Do not be materialistic. "232 Moneylenders or
bankers? "0 you who have attained to faith! Do not gorge
yourself on usury, doubling and redoubling it - but remain
224. 1 Corinthians 6:18; see also 1 Thessalonians 4:4-5 ("For this is the will of
God, your sanctification: that you abstain from fornication; that each one of you know how
to control your own body, in holiness and honor, not with lustful passion, like the Gentiles
who know do not know God").
225. The Didache 2:2. See THE DIDACHE: TaE TEACHINGS OF THE TWELVE
APOSTLES 4 (R. Joseph Owles trans., 2014).
226. Id.
227. Leviticus 26:1. See also The Didache 2:2 ("Do not practice magic.").
228. Leviticus 19:26.
229. Qur'an 5:90.
230. 1 Corinthians 6:10.
231. Qur'an 2:219.
232. The Didache 2:2; see also Self-Realization 62, in THE BHAGAVAD GITA 96
(Eknath Easwaran trans., 2d ed. 2007) ("When you keep thinking about sense objects,
attachment comes. Attachment breeds desire, the lust of possession that burns to anger.");
The Katha Upanishad 27, in THE UPANISHADS 74 (Eknath Easwaran trans., 2d. ed. 2007)
("Never can mortals/Be made happy by wealth. How can we be/Desirous of wealth when
we see your face/And know we cannot live while you are here?").
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conscious of God, so that you might attain to a happy state.
233
Thieves? "Do not steal," and "[d]o not yearn to possess things
that belong to your neighbor."
234
Restaurant customers who want their meat rare or medium
rare? "You shall not eat anything with its blood., 235 Food from
the sea that does not have scales or fins, or persons that harvest
them?
Everything in the waters that has fins and scales,
whether in the seas or in the streams - such you may eat.
But anything in the seas or the streams that does not have
fins and scales, of the swarming creatures in the waters and
among all the other living creatures that are in the waters -
they are detestable to you.
236
Certain types of clothing? "[N]or shall you put on a
garment made of two different materials." 237 What about the
immensely popular pre-tom jeans? "[D]o not tear your
vestments, or you will die." 238  Women who dress
"inappropriately?" "[W]omen should dress themselves
modestly and decently in suitable clothing, not with their hair
braided, or with gold, pearls, or expensive clothes." 23 9 Men who
wear gold or pure silk? "Islam has ... prohibited two kinds of
adornment for men while permitting them for women. These
are, first, gold ornaments and, second, clothing made of pure
silk., 240 What about cross-dressing? "A woman must not put
on a man's apparel; nor shall a man wear women's clothing; for
whoever does these things is abhorrent to the LORD your
God.",24 1 Clean clothes and proper grooming? "Let your clothes
always be freshly washed, and your head never lack
ointment., 24 2  Women with perfume? "The woman who
233. Qur'an 3:130; see also Qur'an 2:275 ("Those who gorge themselves on usury
behave but as he might behave whom Satan has confounded with his touch.").





239. 1 Timothy 2:9.
240. YUSUF AL-QARADAWI, THE LAWFUL AND PROHIBITED IN ISLAM: AL-HALAL
WAL HARAM FIL ISLAM 82 (Kamal EI-Helbawy et al. trans., 1994) [hereinafter LAWFUL
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perfumes herself and passes through a gathering is an
adulteress.
243
What about certain haircuts and beards, given that "[y]ou
shall not round off the hair on your temples or mar the edges of
your beard.",244  Wigs and/or hairpieces? For females, "the
addition of any other hair, real or artificial, to one's own hair -
that is, the wearing of wigs and hairpieces - is also
prohibited., 245  Similar risks lurk for "[m]en [who] are
prohibited such things to an even greater degree. 246 Men who
shave their heads? "They shall not make bald spots upon their
heads., 247 Or bald men? As Elisha went to Bethel, "little boys
came out of the town and jeered at him, saying, 'Go away
baldhead! Go away, baldhead."' 248
Then there are tattoos and body piercings: Neither
Christian nor Jew "shall ... make any gashes in your flesh for
the dead or tattoo any marks upon you. '2 49 In a similar vein,
"[t]he Messenger of Allah (peace be on him) cursed the tattooer
and the one who is tattooed, the shortener of teeth, and the one
whose teeth are shortened., 250 And indeed, attorneys and/or law
professors:
There are ignorant people who speak flowery words
and take delight in the letter of the law, saying that there is
nothing else. Their hearts are full of selfish desires, Arjuna.
Their idea of heaven is their own enjoyment, and the aim of
all their activities is pleasure and power. . . . Those whose
minds are swept away by the pursuit of pleasure and power
are incapable of following the supreme goal and will not
attain samadhi.251
These are just a few of the myriad possibilities, limited to a
quick survey of major religious texts. These alone pose vexing
challenges for any rule that would privilege religious beliefs in
the face of a public accommodations claim. To take just three
243. LAWFUL AND PROHIBITED IN ISLAM, supra note 259, at 167.
244. Leviticus 19:27.
245. LAWFUL AND PROHIBITED IN ISLAM, supra note 259, at 90.
246. Id. at91.
247. Leviticus 21:5.
248. 2 Kings 2:23.
249. Leviticus 19:28.
250. LAWFUL AND PROHIBITED IN ISLAM, supra note 259, at 88.
251. Self-Realization 42-44, in THE BHAGAVAD GITA, supra note 250, at 93.
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examples. There are an estimated 1,335,963 "active resident
attorneys" in the United States,252 and approximately 16,900 law
professors.253  Religious beliefs that would justify refusing
service to those individuals would have profound implications.
A recent survey in turn estimates that four in ten adults between
the ages of 18 and 69 have tattoos.254 Any exemption that
would allow a business to refuse service to 40% of the adult
American population is, to say the least, significant. And these
are just three of the possibilities available under a regime that
protects sincere individual religious beliefs, regardless of their
origins, and treats all as worthy of respect, even the most
outlandish.
CONCLUSION
I do not pretend to have a complete mastery of the complex
set of cases and doctrines governing Free Exercise Clause
claims. This is my first foray into the field, and it undoubtedly
does not do full justice to the pronouncements of the Court and
the various theories and approaches that true scholars of the
Clause have advanced. My arguably amateur take is,
nevertheless, that it is important to consider the implications of
any possible rule allowing religious exemptions to public
accommodations laws in the light of the teachings of Frazee and
Ballard.
Religion, however defined, and however embraced or
rejected, is a central element in American life. As Justice
William 0. Douglas correctly, albeit controversially observed,
"[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being." 25 5  Religion can be a tremendous force for
good. It can also be, as James Madison observed, a force for
252. New ABA Data Reveals Rise in Number of U.S. Lawyers, 15 Percent Increase
Since 2008, A.B.A. (May 11, 2018), [https://perma.cc/2T8K-6P7J].
253. Occupational Employment and Wages, U.S. BUREAU Of LAB. STAT. (May
2017), [https://perma.cc/5CDL-2A5 P].
254. Martin Armstrong, 4 in 10 U.S. Adults Have a Tattoo, STATISTA (June 26,
2017), [https://perma.cc/TEF3-Z9QA].
255. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
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evil, given that religion, "[e]ven in its coolest state... has been
much oftener a motive to oppression than a restraint from it. ' 25 6
The highly deferential standard articulated in Smith is
almost certainly inadequate to the task of balancing the
competing interests posed by a case like Masterpiece Cakeshop.
As Professors Berg and Laycock have argued, some form of
"[h]eightened scrutiny of laws burdening the free exercise of
religion would provide a means of protecting the essential
interests of both [individuals and groups] and religious
dissenters." 257  That is likely true, but poses its own set of
problems. Every current form of heightened scrutiny requires
drawing lines, the nature and location of which provoke sharp
disputes. The Court, for example, has never defined what makes
government interests "compelling" as opposed to simply
"important. ' 258  RFRA, in turn, requires that a judicially
cognizable burden on a sincerely held religious belief be"substantial, ' 259 a limitation that has provoked its own set of
disputes and suggestions. 260
I don't know exactly what that standard should be and how
it would operate. I do know that it must be crafted in the light of
the reality that each individual has the right to formulate and
embrace a sincerely held religious belief, and that it is not within
the province of the body politic or the courts to condemn those
beliefs as antithetical to dogma or social norms. As Professor
Gedicks has emphasized, "[a]s the Court's religious-question
precedents make clear, rationality or plausibility ... is
irrelevant; what matters is not whether the court finds a
claimant's understanding of theological consequences credible,
256. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 1787-1788, 205, 213-14 (Robert A. Rutland et al., eds., 1977).
257. Berg & Laycock Brief, supra note 55, at 35-36.
258. As already noted, debates about these two standards have infected discussions
in gender discrimination cases. See supra text accompanying notes 175-77.
259. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141,
1993 U.S.C.A. (107 Stat.).
260. Professor Gedicks, for example, proposes that courts use "tort and other
established bodies of secular law to adjudicate the substantiality of religious burdens."
Gedicks, supra note 126, at 150. Professor Helfand disagrees, arguing that this "proposed
solution . .. misses the entire object of RFRA." Michael A. Helfand, Identifying
Substantial Burdens, 2016 ILL. L. Rpv. 1771, 1789 (2016). He argues instead that "to
determine whether a law substantially burdens a person's religious exercise, a court might
consider whether, by engaging in religious exercise, persons will be subject to some form
of civil penalty." Id. at 1791.
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but whether the claimant does., 261 This poses its own set of
problems: the risk "that the resulting legal landscape would
likely be one in which government laws are pockmarked by
constitutionally compelled religious exemptions, causing harm
to both legitimate regulatory interests and ... threatening the
rule of law by allowing individuals to become 'laws unto
themselves.' "262
Further complications lie in the suggestion that in many
instances when the Court has recognized and protected free
exercise it has "hinted that it would not be so kind to religious
views it found less appealing." 263  For example, as Professor
Mark Tushnet has observed, "[i]t is not unfair to read [Yoder] as
saying that the claims of the Amish prevailed because they were
a 'good' religion."2 64  But that cannot be the law in a regime
within which Frazee and Ballard remain on the books and all
beliefs that are sincerely held are entitled to respect, no matter
how outlandish they might seem. "Abhorrence of religious
persecution and intolerance is a basic part of our heritage. ''265
That must be especially so in today's world, for we truly live in
"a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every
conceivable preference." 266 The Court may wish to search for
"circumstances in which individualized exemptions from a
general requirement are available., 267 But is it truly appropriate,
much less possible, to pick and choose which beliefs get
protected, at least as matters stand? Indeed, should religious
claims be given favorable treatment, to the exclusion of secular
ones? As Professor Marshall has noted, "[c]laims based on
261. Gedicks, supra note 126, at 130-31.
262. William P. Marshall, Bad Statutes Make Bad Law: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,
2014 S. CT. REV. 71, 103 (2014) (quoting Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)).
263. See Nicholas J. Nelson, A Textual Approach to Harmonizing Sherbert and
Smith on Free Exercise Accommodations, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 801, 811-12 (2008).
264. Mark Tushnet, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court: Kurland
Revisited, 1989 SuP. CT. REV. 373, 381-82 (1989). See also Helfand, supra note 279, at
1788 ("Courts arc predisposed to favoring religious majorities, whose religious practices
are more well-known and respected, as opposed to religious minorities, whose religious
practice are more obscure.").
265. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961).
266. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982) ((quoting Braunfeld, 366 U.S.
at 606) (internal quotation marks omitted)).




religion are not entitled to judicially created exemptions from
laws of general applicability unless such exemptions are
available to those manifestations of secular ideas as well., 268
Various proposals have been advanced, from a blanket
embrace of Smith to its repudiation and the protection of all
religious beliefs. In most instances, proponents of change
advocate for some sort of "balancing" or "weighing" of the
competing interests of the religious adherent and the body
politic that has condemned discrimination on the basis of
various group identities.
Professor Steven Smith, for example, has suggested one
possible approach, stating that:
[G]overnment should not lightly impose burdens on
the exercise of anyone's religion, but if government is not
merely being insensitive but instead has solid and
legitimate reasons for declining to exempt religious
objectors from complying with a general law, courts should
defer to such democratic judgments. 269
The general assumption is that in order "[t]o maintain an
organized society the guarantees religious freedom to a great
variety of faiths requires that some religious practices yield to
the common good., 270 So, for example, I assume that there is a
general consensus-based on "solid and legitimate" reasons-
for the democratic judgment that discrimination on the basis of
race and gender cannot be tolerated in the name of the "common
good.",27 1  But what do we do when the field of inquiry and
268. William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as
Expression, 67 MiNN. L. REV. 545, 547 (1983). The reflexive response to this argument is
that religion is special in the light of the Free Exercise guarantee. That notion does not
account, however, for the problems posed by the Establishment Clause, which counsels
against granting religion a preferred position. For an example of the tensions posed,
compare United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166, 187 (1965) with Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 337-38, 343 (1970) which focus on religious qualifications for
conscientious objector status.
269. Steven D. Smith, Religious Freedom and Its Enemies, or Why the Smith
Decision May Be a Greater Loss Now Than It Was Then, 32 CARDOZO L. R-EV. 2033, 2041-
42 (2011).
270. Lee, 455 U.S. at 259.
271. But see Peterson v. Wilmur Commc'ns, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1015 (E.D.
Wis. 2002), where the court held that Creativity, "the central tenet of which is white
supremacy," is a religion. See discussion supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text. In
important respects, the court's analysis focused on "the religious claimants'
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dispute expands exponentially, as it inevitably must in our
multicultural, pluralistic society? On what bases do we draw the
lines? How do we explain to those who believe something with
all their heart and soul that these deeply personal and
meaningful principles must yield in the face of a general public
commitment to nondiscrimination? In particular, how do we
respond when the belief in question is clearly protected, even
though it is "not acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others."
272
As indicated, Jack Phillips is not a member of a formal
church. He is simply someone who has read the Bible and
found within its pages a command to neither participate in nor
facilitate same-sex marriages. Those claims have attracted
considerable support. They track closely ones embraced by
some mainstream religions and their adherents. 273  They also
resonate within segments of the population that are appalled by
the existence of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender
individuals, much less the notion that they are entitled to
protection under measures barring discrimination in places of
public accommodation. These claims have, accordingly, an
appeal that differentiate them from, for example, the naked
assertion that an individual appearing in court must don his
"spiritual attire," in that instance, to dress like a chicken.274
That said, how will we respond to the myriad examples of
religious mandates I have identified in this article? These
proscriptions are found in readily-accessible religious texts that,
if embraced, provide the bases for refusing service to literally
millions of individuals?
The claims that have garnered the most attention to date are
those made by individuals like Jack Phillips, who asserts a right
to refuse service to individuals sharing characteristics-sexual
identity-whose legal significance and treatment remain matters
understanding." See supra note 126 and accompanying text. The court fashioned a result
that those arguing for that possible standard would almost certainly reject.
272. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
273. Joanna Piacenza & Robert P. Jones, Ph.D., Most American Religious Groups
Support Same-sex Marriage, Oppose Religiously Based Service Refusals, PUB. RELIGION
RES. INST. (Feb. 3, 2017), [https://perma.cc/6HMQ-VDXL] The survey identified three
major religions as opposed: Jehovah's Witnesses, 53%; Mormons, 55%; and White
evangelical Protestants, 61 %.
274. See State v. Hodges, 695 S.W.2d 171 (Tenn. 1985).
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of intense dispute in the courts and the body politic. Any
holding recognizing a right to discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation would be significant and viewed with applause or
alarm, depending on which side of that contentious divide one
lies. But the effects of such a ruling cannot and should not be
confined to such claims. It would also inevitably invite other
individuals to test the judicial waters, to, for example, refuse to
serve any or all of the myriad populations I have uncovered that
are subject to religious condemnation. Beards? 275  Tom
clothing? 276 Tattoos or piercings?277 Attorneys, or even law
professors? 278




278. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
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